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AFM Magazine

AFM Magazine


No Punting Allowed

by: Rex Lardner
Editor American Football Monthly
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The controversy began last November 16th when New England Coach Bill Belichick went for a fourth down conversion late in a game from deep in his own territory against the Indianapolis Colts. With 2:08 left and the Colts with only one timeout, a successful conversion, in all probability, would have won the game. Belichick felt – from his own research – that the Patriots had a 60% chance of making the fourth and two for a first down. The Patriots were stopped short, the Colts took over, scored a touchdown, and ultimately won the game, 35-34. Should the Pats have punted in this situation?


For over 100 years, the punt has been considered the hallmark of sensible coaching. While some consider the punt a symbol of surrender and retreat, it is generally thought to be an automatic cautious coaching call.


Over the past decade, college mathematicians and risk-management professors have proposed that football teams statistically would be better off trying to convert a fourth down rather than punting, even deep in their own territory. David Romer, a Cal Berkeley Economics Professor, authored a 60-page thesis that outlined the risks and rewards of not punting the football (‘Do Firms Maximize? Evidence From Pro Football’). The numbers were put together with various factors in place – location of the ball, where the opponent would likely get the punt, time of the game, where it’s being played, emotion at the time of the decision, how the decision would affect both teams, the weather – and determined the most likely outcomes. In the course of the three seasons that Romer studied, there were 1,068 fourth down situations in which NFL teams, mathematically, would have been better off going for it. In all but 109 cases the teams either kicked or punted.
While many NFL coaches were skeptical of Romer’s findings, it did hit home work with Kevin Kelley, head coach at Pulaski Academy, a private school in Little Rock, AR. “People are brainwashed about punting,” said Kelley. “Many people believe you are required to punt. It’s like someone said punting is what you do on fourth down and everyone did it without asking why.”


Kelley researched the subject and found a number of statistical analyses that reinforced his instincts to have a no-punting philosophy. He started toying with the idea in 2003 – his first year as head coach – and then continued to the point where his Bruins have not punted since 2007. In fact, there’s not a punter or place kicker on the Pulaski roster. But his record over that span speaks for itself: two state championships, a state finalist and an overall 75-17 record in seven seasons. His overall playoff record is 20-5. Think about it – a state title without a punt the entire season.


Kelley determined that the average high school punt play will push the opponent back 30 yards. He has also calculated that Pulaski converts on fourth downs about 50% of the time. Kelley also knows that on a typical fourth and long play near his own end zone, a punt will result in the opposing team taking possession inside his team’s 40-yard line and moving down to score a touchdown 77% of the time. If his offense from the ten yard line goes for it on fourth down and misses, the opposing team will score a touchdown 92% of the time. “If my team has a 50% chance of making the fourth down, it doesn’t make sense to give up the ball,” said Kelley. “For that 15% differential, I feel it’s worth it and I’ll always have my offense go for it. I am a numbers guy and the numbers show that I have a better chance of winning ball games by going for it on fourth down than I do if I punt every time we see fourth down. Besides, I hate to have my offense come off the field.”


Since Kelley has been head coach, every year his team has converted a larger percentage of fourth down plays than third down plays. The figures for each of Kelley’s seven seasons as head coach, 2003-2009:

Year % 3rd down % 4th down
conversions conversions

2003 49% 50%
2004 37% 47%
2005 40% 46%
2006 48% 59%
2007 39% 49%
2008 46% 59%
2009 39% 51%


When going for it on fourth down, psychological factors can affect both the offense and defense. “When you decide not to punt on fourth down, it is a philosophy where you have to think about it the entire game,” said Kelley. “It changes your offensive philosophy but changes the defensive philosophy as well. But with us, they know they have to stop us on fourth down as well.”


Now, third and seven is not necessarily a passing down. “Our third and seven is really like second and seven,” said Kelley. “We’re not worried about getting the first down on one play. Defenses prepare differently and it gives your offense a different mindset. We have four chances, not three. When we do make a fourth down conversion, it creates the same atmosphere a turnover does. It psychologically lifts our team and deflates the defense. When we convert a fourth down play on a drive, we score 84% of the time.”


From a psychological standpoint, the team is going to be used to not making a first down half of the time and not worrying about it because they are confident that it will even out. It also helps play calling because the quarterback always knows it takes four downs to get ten yards. “We condition our kids in practice for that fourth down,” said Kelley. “We know week after week we’ll be going for it. Put people in a situation of greater stress and their heart rate increases, breathing rate increases, the mind races, and that simply gives us a bigger advantage on that one down as well as exhausting the opposing team later in the game.


A defensive coordinator who played against Pulaski last fall commented that defending against the Bruins was a nightmare. “As a DC, I always get a great feeling when our team stops our opponent on third down and we know we’ll get the ball back,” said the coach who wanted to remain anonymous. “But it scares you to death when you know they’re going to go for it on fourth down and it’s really deflating when they make it. We often don’t know if we should use a nickel or dime defense on fourth down. In playing them, when they convert a fourth down, it’s almost as if they’ve scored on us. I find it very difficult to defend against.”


Kelley has won over players and parents, as well as his administration, with his ‘no-punting allowed’ philosophy. Friday night home games in Little Rock are now known as ‘Fearless Fridays.’ “We practice fourth down situations during the week,” said Kelley. “We want to make sure there’s as little stress as possible on our players no matter what the down and situation.”
The approach is radically different on both the college and NFL level. The two biggest reasons for a more conservative approach at those levels are job security and subsequent reaction by administration, fans, and the media. “Our situation is not going to happen at the major college or NFL level,” said Kelley. “Every coach at those levels wants to keep his job and he has to ask if a potential fourth down conversion is worth the risk. It’s certainly an easier decision to punt.”


Of the 120 College Bowl Subdivision teams, Toledo led all schools in fourth down conversions last fall with 16 of 20 or 80%. The Air Force Academy attempted the most fourth down conversions (38) while National Champion Alabama was 10 of 17 and runner-up Texas 8 of 14. Penn State attempted only six fourth down conversions and Ohio State attempted only nine. Hawaii finished last among all FBS schools, going 0 for 10. In fact, the average number of fourth down attempts for FBS colleges for the 2009 season was 16.6 and the conversion rate was 8.0 or just under 50%.


In the NFL, the average conversion rate on fourth down is about 50% over the last five years. This includes going for the first down and not attempting a field goal in a fourth down situation. But the average NFL team will only attempt the fourth down conversion about 17% of the time. Last fall NFL teams combined for more than 4,000 fourth down situations and 54% of the attempts were successful.


Kelley also onside kicks a lot – roughly 65% of the time. “I believe we have a 25% chance of getting the ball when we onside kick,” said Kelley. “Statistics show that the average kickoff return is to about the 35 yard line. For an onsides kick, the ball is recovered at about the 47 yard line. For that 12 yard difference, I feel it’s worth attempting the onside kick.”


Pulaski features seven different kinds of onside kicks. These include bunching eight players on one side of the field and three on the other; faking the kick with one kicker while another player shifts over to kick to a vacated spot in coverage; clustering all 11 players before spreading out just as the ball is kicked; bouncing a hard kick off the turf for a jump ball; and launching a ‘helicopter kick.’ That is, kicking a ball placed on the ground against the tee. The ball then spins like a helicopter propeller and moves like a curveball.


Kelley said that it took awhile for the home crowd to get used to the idea of not punting as well as multiple onside kicks. “When we first started going on every fourth down, our home crowd would boo and the players would be distressed. You need to be accustomed to the philosophy and buy into the idea. Now our crowd and players expect us to go for it and get excited when no punting team comes onto the field. When my son sees an NFL team punting on a short yardage situation on television, he gets upset because he’s grown up with the idea that punting is usually bad."






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